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Abstract
We model the market for news as a two-sided market where news-
papers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to adver-
tisers who value advert-receptive readers. In this setting, monopolistic
newspapers under-report or bias news that sufficiently reduces adver-
tiser profits. Paradoxically, increasing the size of advertising eventu-
ally leads competing newspapers to reduce advertiser bias. Nonethe-
less, advertisers can counter this effect if able to commit to news-
sensitive cut-off strategies, potentially inducing as much bias as in the
monopoly case. We use these results to explain contrasting historical
and recent evidence on commercial bias and influence in the media.
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“[French TV channel] TF1’s job is to help a company like Coca-
Cola sell its products. For a TV commercial’s message to get
through, the viewer’s brain must be receptive. Our programs
are there to make it receptive, that is to say to divert and relax
viewers between two commercials. What we are selling to Coca-
Cola is human brain time.”
Patrick Le Lay, President of TF1 (James, 2004)
A free and independent press is vital to society and to democratic govern-
ment. Advertising plays an important role as a major source of media fund-
ing.1 This paper studies how advertising affects the ability and incentives of
media to provide high quality, independent news. There are two contrasting
views. The “liberal” view of media history claims advertising has a positive
effect on the media, highlighting how the revenues enable newspapers to be
independent from states and political parties. The “regulatory” view, on the
other hand, argues that media may distort their coverage to accommodate
advertiser concerns, even claiming that excessive commercialism in news and
media content weakens the participatory foundations of democracy.
We develop a simple unifying framework within which both positions can
be articulated. Specifically, we model the market for news as a two-sided
market where newspapers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell
space to advertisers who value access to ad-receptive readers. We prove that
advertising can actually raise accuracy by increasing the intensity of compe-
tition for readers. Concretely, our first main result is that, when advertising
is sufficiently large, competing papers set maximal accuracy, even on topics
1Mainstream US newspapers generally earn over 50 and up to 80% of their revenue
from advertising; in Europe, this percentage lies between 30 and 80%, e.g., averaging 40%
in the UK (see e.g., Baker, 1994; Gabszewicz et al., 2001). Overall, advertising exceeds
2% of GDP in the US and a substantial fraction of this becomes media revenue: 17.7%
to newspapers, 17.5% to broadcast TV, 7.4% to radio and 4.6% to consumer magazines
(Advertising Age, 2007).
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sensitive to advertisers. So, paradoxically, advertisers have no influence pre-
cisely when their economic importance is greatest. Our second main result
shows, in contrast, that advertisers escape the paradox when able to com-
mit to withdraw advertising from papers that are “too accurate” on certain
sensitive topics.
Two historical episodes (called “media revolutions” by Lippmann, 1931)
provide the cornerstone of the liberal view. First, after sharp cuts in advertis-
ing duties accelerated newspaper advertising in the 1830s, British newspapers
began to proclaim their independence from government and to reject their
clandestine government grants (see Asquith, 1975, and Curran and Seaton,
2003). Second, newspapers became significantly more independent of po-
litical parties over the late 19th Century, partly thanks to the growth in
advertising that accompanied mass production.2
The regulatory view grew out of evidence that some advertisers seriously
interfere with media content.3 The case of tobacco is particularly well-
documented. Baker (1994) and Bagdikian (2000) offer detailed accounts
of the history of suppression of news on tobacco-related diseases. Comple-
menting this evidence, Warner and Goldenhar (1989) statistically identify
tobacco advertising as causing the reporting bias (for further evidence, see
e.g., Kennedy and Bero, 1999). Another more recent case is misreporting on
anthropogenic climate change. Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) demonstrate a
clear bias in the US quality press over 1988-2002 (see Oreskes, 2004, on the
scientific benchmark). Automotive advertising has been signalled as a key ex-
planatory factor: in the US in 2006, automotive advertising alone accounted
for $19.8 billion of which nearly 40% went to newspapers and magazines
(Advertising Age, 2007).
Proponents of the regulatory view also point to a general “dumbing down”
2See Curran and Seaton (2003) and Koss (1981, 1984) for the British case, and Baker
(1994), Baldasty (1992), Hamilton (2004) and Kaplan (2002) for the US case.
3Baldasty (1992) and Curran and Seaton (2003) provide historical evidence; Bagdikian
(2000), Baker (1994), Hamilton (2004), Herman and Chomsky (1988) and McChesney
(2004) all contain well-documented accounts of ongoing distortions. See also the series of
Royal Commissions on the Press (and FCC hearings in the US) that investigated specific
concerns (discussed in Curran and Seaton, 2003, and Doyle, 1968).
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and “neutralization” of media content. Hamilton (2004) carefully documents
a reduction in “hard news” and a growing tendency to emphasize happy,
positive and uncontroversial content. See also Baker (1994) whose evidence
on the causal role of advertising corroborates the comments of Le Lay quoted
above.
This evidence motivates us to formally analyze why profit-maximizing
advertisers might have a preference for suppression of information on specific
topics or for a general dumbing-down of content. In Subsection 2.5, we sketch
a derivation of such preferences with fully rational readers. To isolate the
effect of these advertiser preferences on media content, we assume all readers
prefer informative content.
In the market benchmark without advertising, newspapers report all news
accurately. As advertising grows, a monopoly newspaper will end up under-
reporting on all topics sensitive to advertisers; newspapers simply internalise
a share of aggregate advertiser surplus.
In Section 4, we derive our first main result: paradoxically, heavy ad-
vertising eventually leads competing newspapers to set maximal accuracy
on all topics, against the interest of advertisers. Competing papers do not
immediately guarantee accuracy, because they can usually differentiate their
reporting strategies to segment the market and avoid head-on competition.
Nonetheless, with sufficiently heavy advertising, each paper’s value from at-
tracting an extra reader is so high as to preclude this market segmentation.
So, by catalyzing competition, heavy advertising ends up generating full ac-
curacy. This clearly supports the liberal view of advertising.
Indeed, the result can be used to explain a puzzling early interaction
between newspapers and advertising. Initially, advertising led to reporting
distortions. For instance, Baldasty (1992) describes how “‘reading notices’
- essentially, advertisements disguised to appear as news articles” became
common, because “readers would tend to be more receptive to a product
promoted by a supposedly independent source (viz., the newspaper)”; thus
news on the illnesses of excess “brain work” helped sell Warners’ Safe Cure
and similar news stories promoted “Dr Williams’ Pink Pill for Pale People”.
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Despite the duplicity involved, these notices became widespread in the 1880s
and 1890s; indeed, major US newspapers offered standardized rates (Lawson,
1988; Baldasty, 1992). However, as advertising continued to rise, newspapers
sought to attract readers by publicly committing against printing unlabeled
reading notices and the notices declined sharply (Lawson, 1988). More gener-
ally, the ensuing Progressive Era brought increased advertising and is widely
viewed as a golden age of the press, with newspapers competing for readers
by building reputations for “objectivity”(Kaplan, 2002).
Nonetheless, advertising distortions did not disappear. Just as newspa-
pers were building reputations for accuracy, large advertisers began build-
ing reputations for withdrawing their ads from media whose reporting went
against their interest. For instance, the foremost advertiser, Procter & Gam-
ble, set up a policy against advertising in media outlets that broke any of a
broad list of restrictions.4 Moreover, companies began to coordinate their
withdrawals (often through a common advertising agency); for instance,
all US tobacco companies withdrew their ad contracts from the magazine,
Mother Jones, in 1980 after it published an article linking tobacco to health
dangers; similarly, Reader’s Digest was punished for an incisive article on
medical evidence against tobacco.5
In Section 5, we model this by allowing each advertiser to commit to
withdraw its ads from a newspaper that reports beyond a specified cut-off
on sensitive topics. Even without collusion among advertisers, we find that
advertisers with common news sensitivities optimally commit to the same
cut-offs (see also Section 7). Moreover, as advertisers grow in number or size,
they make the cut-offs more restrictive, eventually forcing all newspapers to
under-report or bias as heavily as in the monopolistic case of Section 3. Our
4E.g., stating that reporting should not “in any way further the concept of business
as cold [or] ruthless” (Bagdikian, 2004). Procter & Gamble also ruled out advertising in
any issue of a magazine “that included any material on gun control, abortion, the occult,
cults, or the disparagement of religion” (Baker, 1994).
5See e.g., Bagdikian (2000) and Baker (1994) for a long list of similar withdrawals and
threats. Brown (1979) presents the famous case of NBC’s losses and cautious programming
after being punished for airing a documentary criticising Coca Cola worker conditions in
Florida. Miraldi (1990) even identifies a coalition of businesses that organised to punish
“muckraking” papers back in the 1900s.
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second main result thus reveals how large advertisers with the ability to
commit to withdraw their ads can evade the above paradox. Tobacco’s long
history of success in distorting health reporting by mainstream media offers
a particularly clear and well-documented example.
Our paper is part of a rapidly growing literature. Most closely related
is the idea that advertising affects news content by encouraging media to
target the readers most valued by advertisers. This targeting approach has
been used to study political bias and general dumbing-down (see Hamilton’s,
2004, book-length treatment), cultural bias (see e.g., George and Waldfogel’s,
2003, empirical evidence) and policy bias (see Stro¨mberg’s, 2004a,b, model
and empirical evidence on how the media focus on target-relevant information
and end up inducing policy outcomes that favor the target group). Indeed,
Curran (1978) qualifies the liberal view that advertising freed the press from
political bias, by showing how the radical British press of the 1850s lost its
competitive position, because its working-class readers were unattractive to
advertisers.
What is novel in our paper is to analyze the possibility that advertisers
may want to distort news to influence a given set of readers, rather than dis-
torting content to target particular types of reader. The implications are very
different. For instance, in the targeting models, newspaper competition does
not avoid bias, because any bias is there to please the readers (Stro¨mberg,
2004a; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005); by contrast, in our paradox result,
competition helps remove the bias generated by advertisers seeking to influ-
ence readers, and increasing the value of advertising then actually reduces
advertiser influence.6
Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) provide a thorough empirical analysis that
supports our second main result: in their data, magazines report (or rank)
most favorably those mutual funds that pay for most in-magazine adverts and
their empirical refinements suggest this represents a reporting bias caused by
advertising. Others have analyzed different sources of bias where competi-
6In Gabszewicz et al. (2001), advertising also increases the intensity of competition
for readers, but leads papers to converge on news with a centrist ideology (or “pense´e
unique”). So, contrary to our paradox result, advertising is harmful there.
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tion may help. Dyck and Zingales (2003) suggest that journalists bias news
as a way to “thank” their sources for privileged access to news; Patterson
and Donbasch (1996) study journalists’ own biases; Balan et al. (2003) study
media mergers when newspaper owners want to influence reader ideology;
Anderson and McLaren (2007) analyze this (influence) with fully rational
readers; Baron (2006) considers journalists who seek to have influence. Fi-
nally, our commitment results apply to media influence by other actors (e.g.,
governments and banks) that can threaten to withdraw support from news-
papers; these results offer a new perspective on Besley and Prat’s (2001)
model of how governments influence reporting by buying silence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the general model.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 present the main results on monopoly, duopoly, and the
impact of cut-off strategies. Section 6 elucidates the logic of our results by
allowing for negative pricing. Section 7 analyzes advertiser and newspaper
commitment strategies with multiple topics and advertiser types to determine
which of our main results (paradox or cut-off strategy) applies in a given
setting. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 The Basic Framework
We study competition between profit-maximizing newspapers in a two-sided
market: newspapers sell news to readers and space to advertisers.7 We focus
on the content and accuracy of news. To characterize news reporting, we
classify news stories into K topics (e.g., the stock market, the environment,
sports and health). Each paper chooses how accurately to report news on
each topic: r ∈ [0, 1]K with rk = 1 if the paper reports fully on topic k
and rk = 0 if it makes no reports (or reports uninformatively) on k. We
interpret r as average reporting over an extended period; Subsection 1.5
provides background and alternative interpretations.
7See Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) for general treatments of compe-
tition in two-sided markets.
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1.1 Newspapers
There are N competing newspapers. The newspapers can price discriminate
among advertisers but not readers. So a typical paper, n, selects its reporting
strategy rn ∈ [0, 1]K , its copy price charged to readers, pn ≥ 0, and its prices
qjn ≥ 0 for advertising by each type of advertiser j.
1.2 Readers
Readers are interested in news, but vary in their degree of “interest” in each
topic k. There are I reader types, each characterized by a taste vector si ∈
[0, 1]K where sik represents i’s marginal value of news or increased accuracy
on topic k (e.g., a value from useful information as in Subsection 2.5, or from
knowledge or entertainment) and a reservation value bi ≥ 0. We assume that
readers buy at most one newspaper. So a reader of type i buys any paper n
that maximizes utility,
K∑
k=1
sikrn,k − pn
provided this maximized value exceeds bi; bi ≥ 0 since we assume no reader
is willing to pay a positive price for a paper with rn = 0. To avoid the
degenerate case where newspapers cannot attract any readers even with zero
prices and full accuracy (pn = 0, rn = 1), we assume b
i ≤ ∑Kk=1 sik for some
i ∈ I. There is an equal number (unit mass) of readers of each type, so
denoting reader decisions by the probability xin ∈ [0, 1] that reader i buys or
reads newspaper n, we can write paper n’s readership as
∑
i∈I x
i
n.
1.3 Advertisers
Advertisers are interested in reaching many ad-receptive readers. They care
about how many people read the papers. They also care about what is
reported in the papers, because reporting affects how readers respond to
ads and hence the return to advertising. In 2.5 below, we present a mi-
croeconomic foundation of the following reduced-form of advertisers’ dis-
taste for reporting on certain topics (namely, those that reduce readers’ ad-
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receptiveness). Each of J advertiser types is characterized by a distaste
vector tj ∈ [0, 1]K defining its utility from advertising in paper n,
∑
i∈I
xin
(
1−
K∑
k=1
tjkrn,k
)
− qjn, (1)
(see Subsections 2.5 and 7.1 for the case tjk < 0 with advertisers who instead
value accurate reporting). Since these utilities are additively separable across
newspapers, advertiser j chooses to advertise in paper n (denoted yjn = 1) if
it gives non-negative utility, and otherwise j chooses not to advertise there
(yjn = 0). To study variation in the numerical importance of advertising
relative to readers, we use αj to denote the overall number (or mass) of ad-
vertisers of type j. When talking about an individual advertiser, we will also
use aj to denote the size of the advertiser j (i.e., aj scales up j’s advertising
benefits).
We can now state the objective function for newspaper n,
I∑
i=1
pnx
i
n +
J∑
j=1
αjqjny
j
n. (2)
This implicitly assumes a trivial marginal cost of reporting and printing for
a newspaper paying the fixed costs of maintaining its network of reporters,
editors and news sources, but our results readily generalize.8
1.4 Timing
We study the following four stage game: In stage 1, newspapers set their
reporting strategies; in stage 2, newspapers set the copy price charged to
readers; in stage 3, readers buy newspapers; and in stage 4, newspapers
8When these fixed costs are high, the market may be unable to support competing
papers. Since increased advertising supports a larger number of competing papers, mod-
elling the fixed costs explicitly has no effect on our main results. Moreover, letting the
paper’s fixed costs increase with potential accuracy does not change our results, because
all papers spend the maximal fixed cost when advertising is large enough. (Suppressing
news on a single, sensitive topic may anyway waste potential for accuracy rather than save
on cost.)
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and advertisers negotiate over advertising prices and quantities. In each case,
all players observe the outcomes of all previous stages before acting.
This time ordering is standard. What is important is that r is set in
advance. The idea is that a newspaper takes time to build up its reporting
reputation (see Subsections 1.5 and 7.2); then readers respond to the repu-
tation and advertisers begin negotiating with papers once the papers have
established a strong readership. Nonetheless, advertisers can also build up
reputations over time, so we revisit this timing assumption in Sections 5 and
7. Simultaneity of stages 2, 3 and 4 would slightly complicate the derivations,
but not change our results.
We solve for subgame perfect equilibria. To simplify the exposition, we
assume 1−∑Kk=1 tjk ≥ 0, j ∈ J ; this implies that it is attractive to advertise
in all papers, even a paper n reporting fully accurately on all topics (rn,k = 1,
k ∈ K). We also assume efficient bargaining with sharing in a ratio ρ : 1− ρ
between newspapers and advertisers, where ρ ∈ (0, 1).9 So the full advertising
surplus is exploited, yjn = 1, for all n ∈ N, j ∈ J , and the advertising price is
a fraction ρ of the surplus, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Newspapers charge advertising prices given by
qjn = ρ
∑
i∈I
xin
(
1−
K∑
k=1
tjkrn,k
)
and all advertisers buy ads in all papers, yjn = 1, for j ∈ J, n ∈ N .
1.5 Interpretation of reporting and derivation of ad-
vertiser preferences
In this subsection, we offer three related interpretations of the reporting vari-
able r: accuracy, intensity and complexity (or depth) of average reporting.
We then sketch a micromodel of advertiser preferences. In our view, adver-
tisers do not care about news reporting per se, but they do care about the
9This sharing rule can readily be derived as the outcome of standard non-cooperative
bargaining. Notice that newspapers compete for readers (who by construction seek at most
one paper), but that advertiser preferences are additively separable across newspapers.
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impact of news on readers’ consumption of advertised goods. Our sketch is
therefore based on a derivation of readers’ consumption decisions.
Accuracy Our first interpretation of r is in terms of “accuracy”. Newspapers
can selectively present information to generate bias (see e.g., Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005, for a micro-model of this “slanting”). For instance, a
paper might report on the climate whenever a scientist makes statements
suggesting that global warming is minimal and omit news suggesting global
warming is a serious risk. Newspapers can thereby choose how much to bias
reporting in a particular direction (e.g., towards under-estimation of the risk
of global warming). In our multi-dimensional analysis, 1− rk represents the
degree of bias in a particular direction on topic k.10 We analyze this case
formally below.
Intensity A second, related interpretation of r is based on “intensity”. News-
papers select the frequency and persistence, length and prominence (e.g.,
frontpage headline) with which they report on given topics. This can affect
reader behaviour in two ways: one temporary, the other more permanent.
First, news reporting can affect readers’ moods and attitudes while reading
the paper and coming across its ads; see below for evidence on optimistic re-
porting frames.11 Second, newspapers play a significant role in shaping their
readers’ long-term attitudes and beliefs.12 This has recently been demon-
strated in a controlled field experiment by Gerber et al. (2007): free sub-
scriptions to the Washington Post (but not Washington Times) significantly
increased the Democratic vote. Relatedly, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)
use a quasi-natural experiment on availability of Fox News to demonstrate
that Fox News shifts beliefs and attitudes in favour of the Republican Party.
Tobacco companies’ success in influencing beliefs about tobacco health risks
10To study biased readers, rk = 1 could instead represent readers’ preferred bias. Note
that if advertisers valued accuracy (t < 0), they would then help de-bias news.
11Businesses care about quite general attitudes: e.g., Baker (1994) reports how Este´e
Lauder explained that it would not advertise in the magazine Ms because Ms was not
portraying the sort of “kept-woman mentality” (Lauder’s words) desired by Lauder.
12See Cialdini (1993) on the influential power of message repetition; DeMarzo et
al. (1993) offer a related economic model of beliefs.
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are also well-documented.
The durable effects of news reporting on people’s beliefs and attitudes
explain why firms and governments often care about a newspaper’s report-
ing strategy independently of whether they advertise in the given paper; for
instance, reporting can affect how readers respond to ads encountered else-
where, how readers vote and whether they pressure for regulation or other
policy change. These advertising-independent effects only have impact in the
commitment framework of Section 4, so we defer analysis until then.
Complexity and optimism A third interpretation is that r represents the
“complexity” or “depth” of reporting. As suggested by Le Lay (in above
quotation), critical thinking may distract people from advertisements or put
them in a critical frame of mind, so they become less receptive to ads.13
This view suggests that t would be positive on a very broad range of topics
or programming choices, so we can use it to explain the general “dumb-
ing down” of coverage mentioned in the introduction. The empirical work
of Brown and Cavazos (2005) analyzes advertiser premia as a function of
programming content; they conclude that advertisers prefer content that is
“light and unchallenging.” This also suggests a bias towards optimistic news
and content. Marketing studies repeatedly find that “happy” program con-
texts tend to enhance advertising (see e.g., Goldberg and Gorn, 1987) which
fits with psychology research on mood and decision-making (see e.g., For-
gas, 1995). All this may generate a trend towards more entertainment and
superficial programming, particularly in media outlets like television.14
We now sketch a foundation for the above advertiser preferences in the
case of the accuracy interpretation with self-interested, Bayes rational read-
ers. Newspapers cannot lie, but can suppress information. Readers are aware
13Anand and Sternthal (1992) review the evidence on distraction. Bagdikian (2000)
suggests that complexity may “put the reader in an analytical frame of mind [that] does
not encourage the reader to take seriously an ad that depends on fantasy or promotes a
trivial product.”
14While our focus is on newspapers, our results also hold for television, especially cable
or other subscription-based TV; the only important change is that, with free-to-air TV
(forcing zero prices), the vertical segmentation of Section 3 is not possible.
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of the paper’s strategy, but cannot themselves observe the information avail-
able to the newspaper. We show that advertisers can sometimes still gain
by having the paper suppress information. The underlying intuition is read-
ily described in the context of tobacco. In the 1920s, most readers had
optimistic priors in that they believed smoking was safe; with all news sup-
pressed, posteriors would equal priors and readers would remain willing to
smoke;15 with accurate reporting, by contrast, tobacco companies knew that
readers would, with some probability, learn that tobacco was unsafe and
therefore become unresponsive to tobacco ads. Baron (2006) and Anderson
and McLaren (2007) both provide detailed models of related reader consump-
tion decisions. Our sketch makes the point in the simplest way possible; it is
readily generalized.
The key assumption is that newspapers, but not readers, may observe
the value of a random variable χ that contains information relevant to each
reader in choosing what advertised goods to buy. For simplicity, fix a good
produced by advertiser j and suppose a representative reader’s value of this
good exactly equals the random amount χ, with distribution function F (·).
Suppose also the newspaper observes χ with probability λ > 0 while the
reader does not observe it at all. With E(χ|H) denoting the expected value
of the good, given information H, the reader buys a unit if and only if
E(χ|H) ≥ m,
where m is the (fixed) price of the good. To focus on advertising costs and
benefits, we simply set the advertiser’s fixed and marginal production costs
to zero, so m is also the mark-up over unit cost.
As in the tobacco example, we are interested in the case where readers
have moderately optimistic priors: their unconditional expectation of χ, χ0 =∫
χdF ≥ m. In this case, higher accuracy can reduce expected consumption
of the paper’s readers. If the paper reports fully accurately (r = 1), each
reader consumes with probability
1− λ+ λ (1− F (m)) = 1− λF (m) < 1.
15Surveys suggest that, as late as the 1980s, two thirds of the smoking population in
the US did not believe smoking made a great difference to life expectancy (Baker, 1994).
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If instead the paper suppresses news fully (r = 0), each reader consumes with
probability 1 (since the posterior belief equals the prior). So the advertiser
gains from the information suppression strategy (r = 0): average, per-reader
consumption is higher by λF (m)m > 0.16 In this example, r = 0 (denot-
ing full suppression) is an optimal reporting strategy from the advertising
perspective.17
Since reader i reads at most one paper and only comes across j’s ad
through paper n if yjn > 0, the expected quantity of goods purchased by
reader type i from advertiser j is:
∑
n∈N
xin
(
1−
K∑
k=1
tjkrn,k
)
yjn.
where tjk = λF (m)m for the topic k dealing with the information χ. Since
advertisers make profits m per unit sold, normalizing markup m to one, and
subtracting the advertising costs qjny
j
n, (notice now t
j
k = λF (1) < 1), we can
write advertiser j’s overall profits as
∑
i∈I
∑
n∈N
xin
(
1−
K∑
k=1
tjkrn,k
)
yjn −
∑
n∈N
qjny
j
n ,
which immediately generates the reduced form in Equation (1).
2 Newspaper Monopoly
We start with the benchmark case of a monopoly newspaper (N = 1).18
Our goal is to understand how the newspaper’s equilibrium reporting varies
16By contrast, readers gain at least s = E (χ−m/χ > m) Pr(χ > m) − E (χ−m) > 0
from accurate reporting; they gain more if using χ for other decisions too.
17When advertisers also face pessimistic readers, they prefer a different type of reporting
bias. For example, if on top of the above optimistic readers, some fraction of pessimistic
readers have consumption value χ− k where χ0 − k < m, the strategy r of reporting χ if
and only if χ ≥ m+ k may be optimal (provided λ is not too high).
18The single paper monopoly benchmark proves most relevant for Section 4, but see
below on alternative benchmarks. Monopolistic newspaper markets became increasingly
relevant over the last century; see e.g., Genesove (2004) and see McChesney (2004) on
general media consolidation.
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with the importance (α) of advertising. Until the more general analysis
of Section 6, we focus on the case with one type of advertiser and one topic
(J = K = 1) that interests all readers (si > 0, i ∈ I), but to which advertisers
are sensitive (t > 0).
Substituting the advertising prices from Lemma 1 into the monopolist’s
objective function (2) above, gives the monopolist’s reduced-form profits:
pi(p, r) =
I∑
i=1
pxi(p, r) + ρα
I∑
i=1
xi(p, r)(1− tr). (3)
The first term represents reader revenue (from selling copies) and the second
term represents advertising revenue (from selling ad space). The tradeoff
in choosing r is straightforward: the paper pleases readers by raising r and
pleases advertisers by lowering r (at fixed readership); since advertisers also
want the paper to have many readers, it helps to define,
rimin =
bi
si
, (4)
the minimal level of accuracy that enables a newspaper to retain type i
readers at p = 0; recall that, except for Section 5, copy prices are always
assumed to be nonnegative. We illustrate this with an example.
Example 1 There are two reader types with (s1, b1) = (1, 3
8
) and (s2, b2) =
(1
8
, 0), a mass α of advertisers of type t = 1
2
, and a sharing rule between
newspaper and advertisers of ρ = 1
2
. When α is small (α < 0.97), the paper
selects maximal accuracy r = 1 and a copy price of p = 5
8
. This extracts
the full surplus from type 1 readers, while type 2 readers are priced out
of the market. Higher α increases the importance of advertising revenues;
this induces the monopolist to reduce accuracy and cut prices to increase
readership. For intermediate values of α (0.97 ≤ α < 4), the newspaper
chooses r = 3
7
and p = 3
56
, and all readers buy the paper. When α is large
(α ≥ 4), the paper decreases accuracy and chooses r = 3
8
(= r1min) and p = 0;
again all readers buy the paper and it is impossible to further reduce accuracy
without losing readers. See Figure 1. ¤
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Figure 1: Monopoly accuracy (solid line) and reader prices (dashed line).
When α = 0, the monopolist always maximizes accuracy to please readers,
but as α becomes large, the advertising revenue term dominates, and the mo-
nopolist focuses on pleasing the advertiser. This drives accuracy downwards,
eventually to a minimal level that retains a profit-maximizing audience. In
general, we can state,19
Proposition 1 For α sufficiently small, a monopolist reports fully accu-
rately, r = 1. For α sufficiently large, it sets p = 0 and reduces accuracy
to the minimal level, r = rιˆmin < 1, sufficient to attract reader type ıˆ, where
ıˆ = argmaxi∈I pi(0, rimin).
An immediate corollary is that if all readers have zero reservation values
(bi = 0, i ∈ I) so that rıˆmin = 0, then sufficiently large α leads the monopolist
to reduce accuracy to zero. In general, however, it faces a tradeoff between
reducing r to raise advertiser surplus per reader, and increasing r to increase
readership. For instance, even when advertising from car and energy com-
panies is very large, a monopoly newspaper will not fully suppress global
warming reports or bias towards environmental reports claiming a zero risk,
19The alternative benchmark (for duopoly) of a two newspaper monopolist deviates
slightly: α = 0 only guarantees full accuracy on one paper and high α only guarantees
a zero price on one paper, because (respectively) differentiation can raise reader revenue
and price discrimination can lower the average accuracy accepted by readers.
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because such a paper would lose credibility and hence all its readers; in the
model, we capture this credibility factor with positive reservation values bi.
An important corollary is that the news reported by the monopolist re-
mains the same whether there is a number α of advertisers of size 1, or a
single advertiser of size a = α. For a single advertiser of size a, whose utility
from advertising in paper n is given by a
[∑
i∈I x
i
n
(
1−∑Kk=1 tkrn,k)] − qn,
Lemma 1 is easily adjusted; the paper charges this advertiser a price of
qn = ρa
[∑
i∈I x
i
n
(
1−∑Kk=1 tkrn,k)] and substituting a = α reveals that
the monopolist’s profit remains unchanged. In other words, advertisers still
exert influence rather than free-ride. This result explains why monopolistic
newspapers might distort their reporting strategies to favor advertisers even
when advertisers are numerous and each advertiser is small; for evidence, see
generic reporting distortions discussed in Sections 1 and 7.
3 Newspaper Duopoly and the Paradox
We now consider duopoly newspaper markets (N = 2), first with homo-
geneous and then heterogeneous readers. We show how heterogeneity may
lead to vertical differentiation (see also Section 6 on horizontal differenti-
ation) and we derive our paradoxical result that increasing the number or
size of advertisers may actually improve the reporting accuracy of competing
newspapers.
3.1 Homogeneous readers
Reader homogeneity precludes market segmentation. Bertrand price-setting
generates perfect competition for readers, who therefore get what they want,
namely full accuracy at zero prices (regardless of α).
Proposition 2 For any α, in a duopoly with only one reader type, the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium has full accuracy and zero prices, rn = 1 and
pn = 0 for n = 1, 2.
This full accuracy result shows that (perfect) competition prevents bias.
It is driven by the following lemma.
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Figure 2: Duopoly without commitment: accuracy (solid lines) and reader
prices (dashed lines).
Lemma 2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of any subgame starting at a profile of reporting strategies
(r1, r2), with r1 6= r2, all readers buy the high accuracy newspaper.
For small and intermediate values of α, both lemma and proposition
depend on the homogeneity assumption, but for large α, they hold more
generally, as we now show.
3.2 Heterogeneous readers
In the more realistic case of heterogeneous readers, advertising can have a
non-monotonic effect on accuracy. When α is small, newspapers differentiate
their reporting strategies to soften price competition for readers. Increasing
α initially leads to lower accuracy as a monopolistic reaction by at least one
paper. When α becomes sufficiently large, the value to each paper of winning
an additional reader is so high that market segmentation is no longer possible.
Intense competition for readers then forces the papers to raise accuracy to
its maximal level (and set the copy price to zero).
Example 2 Take the same parameter values as in Example 1, but with
N = 2 newspapers instead of 1. For α small (α < 0.97), the papers verti-
cally differentiate their reporting strategies. The high quality paper is fully
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accurate and charges a higher price. Figure 2 shows how increasing α ini-
tially leads the low quality paper to reduce its accuracy to maintain market
segmentation, and then (for 0.5 ≤ α < 0.97), to reduce it to zero to further
raise advertiser profits. When α gets too large (α ≥ 0.97), market segmenta-
tion becomes impossible. The high quality paper would have an incentive to
compete for the low quality paper’s readers, and the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium has both papers choosing full accuracy and zero copy prices. ¤
The non-monotonicity effect of advertising on reporting accuracy illus-
trated in this example is a robust phenomenon (see Ellman and Germano,
2006, for a sufficient, heterogeneity condition).
Proposition 3 In a duopoly with heterogeneous readers: (a) when α is
small, the subgame perfect equilibria can involve vertical differentiation with
limited accuracy (in at least one newspaper); (b) large α always leads to full
accuracy and zero prices in both newspapers.
The most important general point here is that of (b): increasing adver-
tising eventually leads all papers to report with full accuracy even though
advertisers prefer minimal accuracy. This paradox follows from a Bertrand-
type competition for readers: advertisers care about reaching readers; indeed,
readers are a prerequisite for newspapers to sell ad space; so increased ad-
vertising raises the intensity of competition for readers.20
As explained in the introduction, this is precisely what occurred at the
turn of the 19th Century in the US. Advertising had grown substantially to
support the marketing needs of increasingly large, mass production firms.
Initially newspapers were more than willing to heavily distort their report-
ing by publishing readers’ notices and advertiser puffs (editorials designed
to promote an advertisers’ products), but the growing advertising prize for
winning a large readership eventually induced the newspapers to compete
intensely for readers. Accordingly, the papers sought reputations for accu-
racy by publicly rejecting reading notices, by committing against related
20This result is about competition between owners and not about the number of news-
papers per se: A monopolist owning two newspapers essentially minimizes accuracy just
like the one paper monopolist of Section 2.
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pro-advertiser biases and by attempting to demonstrate their “objectivity”.
As documented above, there is strong evidence that reading notices were sig-
nificantly reduced as a result of the increased competition for readers. See
also Lacy and Martin (2004) who describe modern evidence on the intensity
of competition and accuracy.
Notice that this paradox result does not depend on the number of adver-
tisers: we can again replace α, the number (or mass) of advertisers, by a,
the size of a single advertiser. Nonetheless, large advertisers with common
interests might be able to build up commitment power and we next show that
this can overturn the paradox result. So the paradox result is most relevant
to contexts with numerous small (and diverse) advertisers, but see Section 7
for a more thorough discussion.
4 Advertiser Cut-Offs (Paradox Revisited)
As noted in the introduction, many advertisers are sufficiently long-lived to
build up reputations for withdrawing their custom from “unfriendly” media
outlets. In this section, we analyze how advertisers can use such commitment
power to influence newspaper reporting. We offer a simple model to capture
in reduced-form the dynamic process by which advertisers build commitment
reputations (alongside newspapers building reporting reputations); see Sub-
section 7.2 for a discussion and further examples of withdrawal threats. We
then derive implications. We end by explaining how this section’s results on
media influence apply to any actor providing significant media revenue (not
just advertisers).
To influence newspapers, advertisers must move before newspapers fix
their reporting strategies. So we now add a stage 0 at which advertisers
can commit to withhold advertising custom from newspapers that breach
a given level of accuracy on a sensitive topic. This is the natural threat
strategy: at stage 0, each advertiser announces a cut-off level of accuracy
r¯j, for j ∈ J , which commits them to set yjn = 0 if rn > r¯j. We refer to
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this as the model with commitment.21 Our goal is to investigate whether
commitment enables large advertisers to escape the competition logic that
led to full accuracy (as α or a →∞) in the duopoly case.
Consider first a single advertiser of size a that sets r¯ < 1. Lemma 1
is slightly adjusted, because now yjn = 0 if r
j
n > r¯
j. For large a, there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuation game with rn = r¯ and pn = 0
for n = 1, 2; competition is intense for rn restricted to [0, r¯], and deviating
outside this range is dominated for large a, since it generates zero advertising
revenue.22 So, how will the advertiser set r¯? For a fixed readership, the
advertiser surplus is decreasing in r¯, hence the advertiser minimizes r¯ subject
to satisfying rimin for enough readers. In the limit as a becomes large, reader
profits become relatively insignificant, so the advertiser’s tradeoff approaches
that of the monopolist in Proposition 1.
When instead there is a large number (α) of advertisers of the same
type, advertisers face a minor coordination problem. If enough advertisers
set the optimal level of r¯, then the papers will accept this restriction and
setting r = r¯ is privately optimal for each advertiser. However, if all other
advertisers make weaker threats, the papers will set r > r¯ and any advertiser
setting r = r¯ will not advertise at all. Notice that it is Pareto optimal for all
advertisers to set r = r¯.
Proposition 4 For sufficiently large α or a, in a duopoly with commitment,
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with accuracy restricted as in the
monopoly case, rn = r¯ = r
ιˆ
min, n = 1, 2, (as in Proposition 1).
The advertisers’ optimal cut-offs gradually become more extreme as the
importance of advertising (α or a) grows. Our ongoing example illustrates.
21Alternative commitment models (e.g., with direct negotiation with newspapers over
r and commitments affecting ρ) also generate our key results. Newspaper-specific cut-
offs (r¯jn) do imply subtle changes, but are less plausible: advertisers often build (cut-off)
reputations (r¯j) relevant to the widest group (all newspapers) or even follow a norm (r¯)
of avoiding all newspapers that contravene a generic “business-friendly” standard.
22There is also a subgame perfect equilibrium with rn = 1 and pn = 0 for n = 1, 2, but
this is less plausible since it is Pareto dominated for the newspapers (and advertisers).
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Figure 3: Duopoly with commitment: accuracy (solid lines) and reader prices
(dashed lines).
Example 3 Adding stage 0 to Example 2 generally has a negative impact
on accuracy, since, as α increases, advertisers make increasingly stringent
demands on newspapers. For low α, (α < 0.63), the market is segmented
and accuracy on the high quality paper is r1 = r¯ =
2(2−α)
4−α . Segmentation
becomes impossible already at α = 0.63, but instead of jumping to 1, r now
jumps to the new cut-off r¯ = 0.81, and prices fall to zero. Accuracy on both
papers is then r = r¯ = 2(2−α)
4−α (for 0.63 ≤ α < 1.54), but eventually falls
to the limiting monopoly value, rιˆmin =
3
8
(= r1min as in Example 1) (for all
α ≥ 1.54). See Figure 3. ¤
Combined with evidence of extensive and repeated threats by tobacco
companies (see e.g., Baker, 1994), this result provides a plausible explanation
of the panel data evidence of Warner and Goldenhar (1989): they found
that reporting bias (suppression of news on tobacco health risks) grew in
magazines that received substantial increases in tobacco advertising in the
wake of the 1971 US ban on advertising tobacco on TV; for these magazines,
the size of tobacco advertising a (and α) increased sharply in 1971, making
the magazines more sensitive to tobacco company threats over reporting.
The evidence in Kennedy and Bero (1999) is also consistent with this result.
Furthermore, Reuter and Zitzewitz’s (2006) find that single mutual fund
advertisers can have significant influence in the magazine market specializing
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in money issues (where they are large advertisers), but no influence on the
Wall Street Journal and New York Times. In the newspaper market, these
mutual funds count as relatively small advertisers, so aj is low. So this
evidence also supports Proposition 4.
As motivated at the end of Subsection 1.5, businesses and governments
may care about news reporting even if they are not advertising in the given
newspaper. To the extent that these parties directly or indirectly contribute
to the paper’s revenues, and can commit to withdraw this support, they too
can force papers to respect their reporting concerns through the mechanism
shown above; their threat must simply place a sufficiently large revenue share
in the balance.23 Examples include mass subscriptions, cheap and reliable
credit, privileged access to information, and direct subsidies of newspapers
or special supplements.
5 Negative Prices
For the sake of completeness, we address here the case where negative pricing
is feasible.24 Allowing newspapers to compete on a broader range of prices
removes the need for them to use accuracy when the competition for readers
becomes extreme. Indeed, we prove that when advertisers are sufficiently
important, newspapers focus on pleasing advertisers by minimizing accuracy;
their advertising revenue allows them to set a negative price that “bribes”
readers to buy their paper in place of a more accurate rival one.
23In Besley and Prat’s (2001) model of media influence, governments bribe all papers,
since information is public once printed in any paper. By contrast, we assume readers only
learn news from their own paper. Our information assumption is common and applies when
readers have neither time nor incentive to tell others all that they learn from their papers’
ongoing reporting. Their assumption is most appropriate to reporting on major scandals.
24Negative prices should not be taken literally, but can capture the effect of bundling
the newspaper with a valuable coupon or gift. Baldasty (1992) describes how newspapers
were often bundled with gifts, such as stockings, watches, cameras and insurance 100 years
back. Such practices remain common today. The moderate gift values may not equate to
actual negative prices, but negative prices do shed light on what drives our paradox result.
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5.1 Monopoly
The possibility of negative pricing requires only a slight change in Proposi-
tion 1: increasing the importance of advertising now always leads a monopo-
list to reduce accuracy to zero and attract all readers (with a negative price
if necessary).
Proposition 5 If a monopoly newspaper is able to offer negative prices, then
when α is sufficiently large, accuracy falls to zero and prices are just low
enough to attract all readers, r = 0 and p = min{−b1, . . . ,−bI} ≤ 0.
5.2 Duopoly
Allowing duopolists to charge unbounded negative prices, overturns the com-
petition paradox identified in Section 3. Competition for readers is just as
intense, but newspapers now can, and for sufficiently significant advertising
always will, compete for readers by lowering copy price instead of raising
accuracy. The reason is that the increase in advertising surplus from low-
ering accuracy can eventually compensate readers for lower accuracy. The
newspaper with lower accuracy therefore ends up winning all the readers. So
Lemma 2 is inverted:
Lemma 3 For sufficiently large α, in a duopoly with negative pricing, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of any subgame starting at a profile of
reporting strategies (r1, r2), with r1 6= r2, all readers buy the low accuracy
newspaper.
As a result, intense competition now leads papers to minimize accuracy
at r = 0 and set (negative) prices that pass on advertising surplus to readers.
Proposition 6 For sufficiently large α, in a duopoly with negative pricing,
all subgame perfect equilibria have zero accuracy and readers are subsidized,
rn = 0 and pn = −ρα < 0, for n = 1, 2.
Newspapers just break even, but accuracy is minimized instead of maxi-
mized; advertisers are much better off than in the case with bounded pricing,
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because the paradox is evaded. This result is, however, subject to two major
caveats. First, using coupons to attract readers typically involves distortions,
in that the coupons cost more to the paper than they are worth to readers,
so it may become optimal to compete on accuracy as well as negative prices.
Indeed, the results of Section 3 are re-established if readers’ values from
coupon expenditures are sufficiently concave. Second, advertisers only value
readers who will notice their ads,25 but coupons may attract “readers” who
simply tear out the coupons and discard the paper. Indeed, in the realistic
case where readers can take both papers and just read the better one (if suffi-
ciently interesting), papers must again compete on accuracy; so the paradox
is re-established (as are the other results of Section 3).
6 Commitment and Coordination: Advertiser
Influence Revisited
The analysis of Sections 3 and 4 makes strongly diverging predictions con-
cerning the extent and nature of advertiser influence on media coverage. In
this section, we investigate further the question of when to expect which type
of influence by discussing advertiser commitment and coordination issues in
an extended preference context.
6.1 Multiple topics and advertiser types
We take the multiple topics and advertiser types setting as a starting point to
better understand under which circumstances the equilibria of Section 3 are
more likely than those of Section 4 and vice versa. All our results generalize,
but we identify some important caveats below in the conflicting preferences
case.
In the basic framework, we assume sik > 0 and t
j
k < 1 for all k ∈ K, i ∈
I, j ∈ J . For simplicity, we now also assume bi = 0 for all i ∈ I. The
monopoly case is straightforward: whenever a topic is disliked enough by
25Advertising rates (per reader) are much higher at paid-for papers than zero-price
papers (“freesheets”), because free-sheet readers are less attentive (Thompson, 1989).
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sufficiently many advertisers (i.e.,
∑
αj · tjk is large), accuracy drops to zero
on that topic. In the duopoly case, multiple topics permit horizontal as well
as vertical differentiation, so market segmentation becomes even easier (see
Ellman and Germano, 2006, for an example). Nonetheless, segmentation is
unsustainable when advertisers are large, so Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 both
extend. In particular, the paradox result is robust.
Proposition 7 In a duopoly, when aggregate advertising (
∑
j α
j) is suffi-
ciently large, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has rn,k = 1 and pn = 0,
n = 1, 2 for k ∈ K.
Just as before, sufficiently important advertising provokes a fully accu-
rate subgame perfect equilibrium, until we introduce advertiser commitment
power, in which case under-reporting at the monopoly level may be imposed.
Proposition 4 becomes
Proposition 8 In a duopoly with commitment, when aggregate advertising
(
∑
j α
j) is large enough, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium where all
papers set zero accuracy on any topic disliked by some advertiser, rk = 0 if
tjk > 0 for any j.
The sensitivities of advertisers combine additively in terms of ad space
pricing, which is why the Section 3 and 4 results generalize. Advertiser pres-
sures also add up, hence Proposition 8, but notice that this emphasizes one
of many possible equilibria. The stated equilibrium is the Pareto optimal
equilibrium for advertisers (and newspapers), but advertiser diversity might
complicate coordination of cut-off threats. To see this point, consider con-
flicting advertiser preferences, meaning that some advertisers are sensitive
to accurate reporting on some topic k (tjk > 0 as before) while others instead
strictly prefer accuracy on this topic (tj
′
k < 0). Agreement among advertisers
on how to coordinate is particularly difficult, since they no longer share a
Pareto-preferred cut-off strategy. Some cut-off strategy equilibria are still
feasible, but the advertiser conflict makes coordination much less likely. So
conflicting advertiser preferences tend to work in favor of the results of Sec-
tion 3 and against those of Section 4. This point sheds further light on Reuter
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and Zitzewitz’s (2006) evidence, cited above in Section 5, that while influenc-
ing specialized magazines, mutual fund advertisers have no influence in the
general interest newspaper market containing more diverse, large advertisers.
By contrast, our results are largely unchanged if we allow for conflicting
reader preferences, meaning that for some topic k, some readers prefer accu-
rate reporting (sjk > 0 as before) while others prefer less accuracy (s
j′
k < 0).
This form of heterogeneity further facilitates market segmentation, but if
there are enough independently-owned newspapers to make each local mar-
ket competitive, the paradox result holds unchanged for commonly valued
topics. The cut-off strategy equilibria also hold unchanged, because this
heterogeneity does not prevent advertisers from using cut-off threats.
6.2 Commitment and coordination
Whether to expect the paradox result or the cut-off strategy result reduces
to the question of whether or not advertisers can commit “early” enough to
withdrawing their ads from excessively “accurate” newspapers. In the model
extension of Section 4, newspapers commit in stage 1 to their reporting strat-
egy r, while advertisers commit in stage 0 to their cut-offs r¯. In reality, both
such reputations are built up over time. Here we briefly discuss the ability
and incentives of advertisers and newspapers to make effective commitments.
To attract readers, newspapers seek to establish a good reputation by
reporting accurately over time, but readers observe distortions imperfectly
(and face costs of switching papers). So newspaper owners typically rein-
force journalistic standards by setting up a board of directors which aims to
guarantee editorial and journalistic independence from the paper’s owners
and business division; indeed, professionals often speak of a “wall of separa-
tion” between the editorial and business wings. As recently debated during
Murdoch’s 2007 takeover of the Wall Street Journal, boards play a valu-
able role but are far from fully effective in this respect (see e.g., Curran and
Seaton, 2003, for UK examples, Baker, 1994, Herman and Chomsky, 1988,
and McChesney, 2004, for US examples).
At the same time, newspapers want to build a reputation with advertis-
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ers. Here, their main concern is just to bargain for a high advertising price.
Advertisers, on the other hand, have a strong incentive to build a reputa-
tion for enforcing reporting cut-offs on the newspapers (as well as to bargain
for low prices). Moreover, when advertising α is large, newspapers actually
benefit if advertisers are successful in building cut-off reputations. So news-
papers are attentive to advertisers and this gives advertisers an important
advantage in setting up their reputation.
When many advertisers gain from a given reputation, the reputation is a
public good, so affected advertisers may need to make a group commitment.
This is easiest in concentrated industries where the number of advertisers
with a given concern is small, particularly if these companies already coop-
erate to fund an industry interest group (and can inflict punishment on any
member company that defects on a cut-off commitment). So concentrated
industries with established lobbying activities (such as the tobacco, energy
and automotive industries) are the most able to exert the greatest pressure
on news reporting.
Nonetheless, mutual enforcement of commitment among advertisers is not
always necessary. Consider a commitment to reject newspapers that publish
particularly controversial or critical reports. Even after a specific newspa-
per report sharply criticising only one advertiser, other advertisers and their
agencies may value the opportunity to signal that they are tough by punish-
ing this newspaper. Also they may view such reports as bad signals about
the newspaper (if e.g., editors differ in their resistance to advertiser pres-
sure). This helps understand the evidence suggesting that multiple diverse
advertisers can pressure media to impose a generic advertiser-friendly re-
porting norm (Baker, 1994) avoiding controversy and dumbing-down general
coverage (Hamilton, 2004).
Ad agencies, marketing and advertising journals help advertisers build
such reputations. The agencies and journals specialize in monitoring how
media reporting strategies affect advertising profits, so they can readily in-
form clients about papers’ “excess” reporting on sensitive topics. Also, large
agencies internalize the benefits from making large numbers of papers more
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amenable to advertising, so they reduce the coordination problem among
advertisers in applying pressure on “deviant” papers. For example, Reader’s
Digest lost the ad agency it had used for 28 years for running an article
on the medical dangers of smoking (Bagdikian, 2000). Relatedly, large ad-
vertisers sometimes apply pressure on ad agencies, as when RJR/Nabisco, a
conglomerate with tobacco interests, punished Saatchi and Saatchi (with loss
of an $80 million food advertising contract) for preparing ads on Northwest
Airlines’ no-smoking policy (Baker, 1994).
In sum, the paradox result can be a robust and realistic prediction when
advertisers are small and have diverse or conflicting interests. On the other
hand, advertisers can influence news content when individual advertisers are
large and potentially also when numerous advertisers share some common
interests, especially if coordinated by large advertising agencies.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzed how and why advertisers might influence media content.
We found that advertising automatically influences reporting in monopolistic
media markets, but that, paradoxically, with competing newspapers, increas-
ing advertising eventually induces maximal accuracy. We also found that ad-
vertisers can escape this paradox, if they can commit to withdraw advertising
from papers that report too accurately on sensitive topics. Large, coordinated
advertisers most readily exert influence via these cut-off commitments, but
we found that even diverse advertisers sharing a common concern (such as
for light and uncontroversial media content) may exert such influence.
This influence potentially leads to poor coverage of important issues. In
our key examples, the influence may have serious consequences, for example
on health, the environment, and even voter participation.26 In these cases,
26The controversy-evasion and general dumbing-down of news coverage (documented
above) has been linked to falls in political participation (see e.g., Teixeira, 1987, and Baker,
1994), so our results offer a theoretical basis for the concern that advertiser influence may
lower participation levels as well as the quality of democratic debate. The underlying
problem in each of our key examples is that, owing for example to externalities, readers
are not willing to pay the social marginal value of improved information.
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our results have clear normative implications: it is socially optimal to avoid
the conditions that generate media distortion. Our paradox result shows
that regulating media competition is extremely important when advertising
is large. Our cut-off results show that, even with competition, regulators
should try to prevent coordinated pressure by large, concentrated advertisers.
If prevention requires banning those advertisers, the welfare costs from lost
advertising benefits and revenues (perhaps implying higher copy prices and
fewer readers) may be too great, but more subtle policies have been proposed
and implemented (see e.g., Baker, 1994, and Doyle, 1968).27
These ideas build on a wealth of empirical evidence (described above) con-
sistent with our predictions (in particular, Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2006, and
the tobacco papers documented above). The recent work estimating bias in
reporting on anthropogenic global-warming (e.g., Boykoff and Boykoff, 2006,
and Oreskes, 2004) could be used to test for influence by automobile and en-
ergy advertisers. Our theory also makes precise predictions that remain to be
tested: in particular, the prediction on how competition interacts with adver-
tising intensity and the non-monotonicity prediction present in our paradox
result. Testing will need estimates of media market concentration, the size,
composition and sensitivity of the relevant advertising market, and the size
of other media revenues, as well as the key dependent variable, media bias.
Thanks to the increasingly sophisticated empirical literature on bias estima-
tion,28 we are optimistic that such tests can be performed and will permit
thorough evaluations of the impact of advertising on media content.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. This follows immediately from our assumptions. ¤
27Some medical associations ban pharmaceutical advertising in their journals to prevent
influence on drug trial reporting. Tobacco advertising, long banned by medical journals,
is now banned for broadcast and print media throughout the US and the EU, albeit
mostly to prevent direct influence by the advertisements. Finally, all advertising is banned
from many publicly-funded TV stations, such as the BBC; here our theory predicts less
commercial influence, but a higher risk of political influence.
28E.g., Boykoff and Boykoff (2004); Groseclose and Milyo (2005); Kennedy and Bero
(1999); Larcinese et al. (2007); Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006).
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Proof of Proposition 1. Reporting strategy r and copy price p are chosen
at stages 1 and 2 to maximize the continuation payoff pi(p, r) defined in
Equation (3). When α = 0, we get full accuracy (r = 1), because marginally
raising r permits to raise p at a rate of at least mini∈I si > 0 and has no cost.
As α increases, raising r begins to have a cost, but as long as α is small, the
benefits from raising p dominate.
For large α, we first prove that r = rimin for some i ∈ I . Suppose to the
contrary that r ∈ (ri1min, ri2min) for some pair of reader types, i1 and i2 with
consecutive values of rmin. By reducing r towards r
i1
min and reducing p by
maxi∈I si times the reduction in r, the paper avoids losing any readers and
it increases its advertising revenue at the rate ραt
∑I
i=1 x
i(p, r), while only
decreasing reader revenue at the rate maxi∈I si
∑I
i=1 x
i(p, r). Since ρ, t > 0,
for sufficiently large α, the gain in advertising revenue dominates the lost
reader revenue. This contradicts the optimality of the above r. The same
argument applies for r > maxi∈I{rimin}. Moreover, clearly r < mini∈I{rimin}
cannot be optimal since it would lead to zero profits, when positive profits
are possible. This proves the claim.
Now, given r = rimin, if p > 0, reducing p to 0, strictly increases readership
by at least 1 (by definition, the readers i with rimin = r start buying when
p = 0) and this raises advertising revenue by at least ρα(1− tr) which again
dominates the loss in reader revenue of
∑I
i=1 px
i(p, r) for sufficiently large α
(notice that 1 − tr > 0 by the assumption in Subsection 1.4). The monop-
olist’s profits are therefore given by pi(0, rimin) and i is chosen to maximize
this. Hence i = ıˆ as stated. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, assume that at stage 1,
newspaper 2 sets r2 < r1, and sr1 > sr2 ≥ b (otherwise, if sr2 < b, there is no
demand for newspaper 2 in any continuation game, and the claim is trivially
true). We show that there is a unique SPE of this continuation game and
that newspaper 1 wins all the readers. Essentially, this follows as in standard
Bertrand competition, where both newspapers seek to undercut each other.
Here, since r2 < r1, for any price p2 ≥ 0, 1 can always win all readers by
offering a price marginally below p2+s(r1−r2) (the price at which the readers
are indifferent between buying from 1 rather than buying from 2 at p2). In
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particular, for any p2 ≥ 0, 1 can always find a price at which it wins all the
readers. This is not true for player 2: since prices are assumed nonnegative,
the lowest price 2 can charge is p2 = 0 and so, unless p1 > s(r1−r2), 2 cannot
undercut 1. Hence 1 will set p1 ≤ s(r1−r2). Moreover, from sr2 ≥ b, we have
sr1−b ≥ s(r1−r2), which guarantees that buying at p1 is individually rational
for readers. Hence, if the inequality is strict and p1 < s(r1−r2), 1 can always
increase profits by raising p1 marginally. It follows that p1 = s(r1 − r2) and
p2 = 0 is the unique continuation SPE. Also, x1 = 1 here, because otherwise
1 would marginally reduce p1 to win over the 1− x1 remaining readers. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. If newspapers set r1 = r2, then Bertrand price
competition generates zero prices. If one paper sets a positive price, the
other paper can either set a higher price and get no readers, set the same
price and get some fraction of the readers, or win all the readers by setting a
lower price. Since a paper without readers makes no profits, and at least one
paper can sharply increase its readership and profits by setting a marginally
lower price than its competitor’s, competition drives prices down to zero.
Using Lemma 2, given a pure strategy of, say, paper 1 with r1 < 1, the
other paper would set r2 marginally higher, thus taking all the readers and
leaving 1 with no profits: if 2 sets r2 < r1, it gets no profits whereas it is
guaranteed positive profits if it sets r2 > r1. Furthermore, r2 = r1 < 1 cannot
be an equilibrium, because at least one paper could marginally raise r and
sharply increase its readership and marginally increase reader revenue (and
advertising profits if α > 0). The equilibrium with r1 = r2 = 1 and zero
prices is the only possible one, since if one paper had a positive price, the
other paper would want to marginally undercut that price. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (a). This follows from Example 2. Part (b).
As α increases further, the incentive to capture all readers increases. The
segmentation equilibrium in (a) eventually becomes unsustainable, because
for sufficiently large α, the paper with higher r would want to compete to
take all the readers. Once segmentation is ruled out, there is no equilib-
rium with r1 6= r2, because in such equilibria the low r paper makes zero
profits by the same logic as in Lemma 2. Furthermore, because all elements
in the support of the equilibrium distribution over levels of accuracy must
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have equal expected payoff, there are no mixed strategy equilibria involving
positive mass on levels of accuracy below 1. Hence, the unique SPE has
r1 = r2 = 1 and zero prices as in Proposition 2. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. Given any r¯ ∈ [0, 1] and α sufficiently large,
there is a SPE with rn = r¯, n = 1, 2 and zero prices. By setting r > r¯, a
paper gets all the readers, but even the full reader surplus is less than the
ρ
2
of the advertising surplus guaranteed from getting half the readers at r¯ .
This is the unique continuation equilibrium given r¯, because lower rn’s are
ruled out by the logic of Lemma 2. With α sufficiently large, the advertisers
choose r¯ to maximize their surplus ((1−ρ)∑i∈I xin(0, r¯)(1−tr¯)) at rιˆmin, since
the monopolist’s objective at (r¯, 0) only differs by ρα
1−ρ times the advertiser
surplus . Notice that in the limit, the equilibrium of this proposition Pareto
dominates all the other ones for both advertisers and newspapers. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is similar to the case of Proposition 1
with the difference that now a monopolist can set negative prices. It is
now possible to lower r to 0 and retain all the readers by setting a price of
p = min{−b1, . . . ,−bI} ≤ 0. For large α, the bounded cost (−p) of attracting
readers in this way is worth paying, because the advertising surplus even on
just one reader is so high. Furthermore, the marginal reduction in reader
subsidy permitted by a marginal increase in r is dominated by the loss in
advertising surplus. Thus, for α sufficiently large, the paper will set r = 0
and set p = min{−b1, . . . ,−bI} ≤ 0 so as to capture all readers. At this
price all readers either strictly or weakly prefer to read the newspaper and
newspaper profits are given by (ρα + p)I À 0 ∀ large α. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, assume that at stage 1,
newspapers set r2 < r1, and sr1 > sr2 ≥ b as before. In stark contrast to
Lemma 2, we show that newspaper 2 now wins all the readers. This follows
by Bertrand competition with the important difference that now prices are
not bounded from below. Newspapers continue to undercut each other as
long as they can make positive profits. Since s > 0, the newspaper with the
lower level of accuracy (here paper 2) is the one that can win the readers,
because its greater advertising “subsidy” dominates the reader disutility from
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its accuracy deficit. More precisely, let p
n
(rn) denote the lowest copy price
that paper n with accuracy rn can charge (as monopolist) and break even;
it is immediate that p
n
(rn) = −ρα(1 − trn) and p2(r2) < p1(r1)(< 0) since
r2 < r1. Clearly, neither paper will ever charge a lower price. Moreover,
for α sufficiently large, for any p1 ≥ p1(r1), paper 2 can always gain by
undercutting paper 1 by just enough to take the entire market. In the unique
continuation SPE, paper 1 competes as far as it can by setting p1 = p1(r1)
and paper 2 wins the whole market (x2 = 1) by setting p2 = p1(r1)−s(r1−r2).
Note that x2 must equal 1, otherwise paper 2 would marginally reduce p2 to
win over the 1− x2 remaining readers. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. If newspapers both set r = r1 = r2, then Bertrand
price competition will lead to zero profits and to all papers being sold at the
lowest sustainable price, namely, p(r) equals the lowest price a newspaper
with r = r1 = r2 can charge and break even (this coincides with p1, p2 of
Lemma 3 where now p(r) = p
1
(r) = p
2
(r) = −ρα(1 − tr)). This is true
regardless of how demand is split between two papers that charge the same
price. A paper selling at a price higher than p(r) can be profitably undercut.
Using Lemma 3, (and parallel to Proposition 3(b)), given any pure strat-
egy of, say, paper 1 with r1 > 0, the other paper’s response is to set r2
marginally lower, thus taking all the readers and leaving 1 with no profits.
Furthermore, r2 = r1 > 0 cannot be an equilibrium, because either paper
could marginally decrease its accuracy and sharply increase readership and
revenues (since α large). Again, because all elements in the support of the
distribution must have the same expected payoff, there are no mixed equi-
libria with positive mass on accuracy levels rn > 0, n = 1, 2. Hence the
equilibrium with r1 = r2 = 0 and prices p1 = p2 = p(0) = −ρα is the only
possible one. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. This result extends Proposition 3(b) and the
proof is very similar. Take a stage 1 profile (r1, r2) ≤ 1 with r1, r2 6= 1, (r1
and r2 are now vectors), and suppose without loss that the subgame perfect
continuation payoff for newspaper 1 is greater or equal to that of newspaper
2. We show that 2 then has an optimal deviation to set r′2 ≥ r1 with r′2 6= r1
(for any α > 0). So the two papers drive accuracy up to rn = 1 in any
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subgame perfect equilibrium. To see this, fix r1 ≤ 1 with r1 6= 1 and consider
the payoff function of newspaper 2,
∑
i∈I
p2x
i
2 +
∑
j∈J
ραj
(∑
i∈I
xi2 (p2, r2)
∑
k∈K
(
1− tjkr2,k
))
since r¯j = 1 and tj ∈ [0, 1)K , j ∈ J . The numbers of readers are characterized
by the following lemma, which extends Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 If, under the assumptions of Proposition 7, we have r′2 ≥ r1 and
r′2 6= r1, then newspaper 2 captures all the readers, (i.e.,
∑
i∈I x
i
2(p, r1, r
′
2) = 2
and
∑
i∈I x
i
1(p, r1, r
′
2) = 0).
To see this, notice that because there are no reservation values for
readers and sik > 0 for all k ∈ K, i ∈ I, newspaper 2 can attract
all the readers by charging a sufficiently low price. Since
∑
j α
j
is large, it is in newspaper 2’s interest to do so. ¤
Now, given r1, if newspaper 2’s continuation payoff at r2 is less than or
equal to newspaper 1’s payoff, 2 would gain by deviating to some r′2 suf-
ficiently close to r1 with r
′
2 ≥ r1 and r′2 6= r1. This gives approximately
paper 1’s advertising profits multiplied by a factor (the total number of read-
ers divided by the original number of paper 1 readers) that exceeds unity.
Advertising revenues dominate reader revenues, so paper 2 would get more
than paper 1 had. Hence there is no subgame perfect equilibrium with either
rn ≤ 1 and rn 6= 1. To see that the profile (rn, pn) = (1, 0), n = 1, 2, is part
of a subgame perfect equilibrium, notice that by Lemma 4, newspapers can-
not have a profitable deviation by changing the level of accuracy since they
would get zero readers and hence zero profits. At r1 = r2 = 1, prices charged
in stage 2 will again be zero, as the argument of the proof of Proposition 2
(see its second paragraph) applies here as well. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8. This result extends Proposition 4. Consider the
continuation game following selection of r¯j = r¯ by all advertisers in stage 0.
Using Proposition 7 (in place of Proposition 3), it is readily verified that
r = r¯ and zero pricing constitutes the unique SPE outcome for sufficiently
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large
∑
j α
j. Therefore, as long as r¯k = 0 for all topics k sensitive to any
advertiser j, this outcome generates the best payoff that each advertiser can
hope for (note that all readers already buy some paper since bi = 0 for all
i). So it is clearly an equilibrium for all advertisers to coordinate on r¯jk = r¯k
in stage 0 (indeed it generates the only Pareto optimal SPE outcome for
advertisers). ¤
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